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1   INTRODUCTION 
The majority of African countries have implemented significant liberalisation of trade 
since the 1980s, with reforms related principally to import liberalisation. The early 
reforms were driven by the World Bank, as trade policy featured prominently among 
the measures included in conditional lending (Greenaway and Morrissey, 2003). By the 
end of the 1980s, those sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries that had implemented 
trade reforms had largely eliminated quantitative import restrictions and export taxes 
(Morrissey, 1995), so subsequent reforms related mostly to further tariff reductions 
(Morrissey, 2002). Average unweighted tariffs have been roughly halved on average 
(for countries) in Africa over the period 1980-85 to 2000-02, from about 33% to 16%. 
North Africa reduced tariffs the least, and by 2000-02 had the highest tariffs of any 
region; Southern Africa has consistently had the lowest tariffs; while East and West 
Africa reduced tariffs the most since the 1990s (Ackah and Morrissey, 2005: Table 6). 
Although there is some evidence that this was associated with increases in imports, 
there is no consistent pattern linking the reduction in tariffs to the increase in imports 
(Morrissey, 2005); there is no indication that tariff reductions resulted in import surges 
(Jones and Morrissey, 2008). This may reflect the cross-industry pattern of tariff 
reductions, if tariffs were reduced least in those industries most susceptible to import 
competition, suggesting political economy explanations of tariff structure and reform. It 
may also be the case that tariffs were reformed in an essentially technocratic manner, 
eliminating peak or redundant tariffs with across the board reductions and 
rationalisation of other rates, so the average effect on imports was limited. The aim of 
this paper is to explore the extent to which underlying political economy or technocratic 
factors can explain the structure of protection and tariff reform in Africa. 
 
The literature on the political economy of trade policy is vast; in what was at the time a 
‘state of the art’ study, Magee et al (1989) has almost 50 pages of references and the 
literature has continued to expand. Major theoretical advances have refined the theory 
of endogenous trade policy (Helpman, 1997) and the measurement of trade distortions 
(Anderson and Neary, 2005). This has spawned a large empirical literature on political 
economy determinants of trade policy, although most studies relate to developed 
economies (Gawande and Krishna, 2003). Similarly, there is a significant literature on 
trade policy and reforms in SSA, reviewed in Morrissey (1995, 2002). However, there 
is to our knowledge no study that attempts to apply political economy theories to trade 
policy in Africa. It is this gap that we aim to fill in the current study. Although there is a     2   
significant political economy literature on Africa, this mostly relates to political 
economy influences on (the lack of) economic development (e.g. Bates, 1983; Ajakaiye 
et al, 2008) or Africa in the context of international political economy (Collier, 2008); 
there are no specific political economy applications to African trade policy. 
 
Although the political economy literature on trade policy relates mostly to developed 
countries (in conception and application), given that the models are based on common 
building blocks ‘the same framework of analysis is relevant for developed and 
developing countries’ (Drazen, 2008: i20). The literature, reviewed briefly in Section 2, 
suggests a large variety of possible variables to capture political economy influences on 
trade policy, but most of these are either inappropriate or unavailable for Africa. For 
example, there is no counterpart in Africa for the political contributions variable 
commonly used in studies of the US. Furthermore, data on structural features of 
manufacturing sectors (such as concentration ratios) or membership of industry 
organisations is not generally available. To identify a parsimonious set of political 
economy factors that are likely to affect trade policy we are motivated by the Grossman 
and Helpman (1994) model (hereafter G-H). This identifies three variables that 
determine the cross-industry pattern of protection: the inverse import penetration ratio 
(industry output divided by industry imports); the industry import elasticity of demand; 
and an indicator variable to capture whether an industry is politically organised or not. 
Although in the model political organisation is intended to capture lobbying 
contributions, in the African context it is interpreted as representing lobbying access to 
policy-makers or influence more broadly. Obtaining data on political organisation is 
very difficult, so we experiment with alternative proxy measures. We do not claim that 
G-H depicts the situation in Africa (and can reject the null hypothesis that it fits the 
African data): some observers of Africa may question the premise that African 
governments have an objective function that includes maximising (general) population 
welfare, while firms are not usually organised at a sector-interest level. However, it 
does help to identify political economy variables, and there may be a specific yet quite 
broad population whose welfare is of concern to government.  
 
Another limitation of the G-H model is that it is intended to explain the pattern of 
protection (or, in our case, structure of tariffs), whereas we are also concerned with the 
pattern of tariff reform. To address the latter, we conduct another empirical exercise to 
see if the political economy factors appear to influence changes in tariffs.  As there     3  
does not appear to be any empirical model in the literature for the determinants of 
changes in tariffs, our approach is fairly ad hoc although motivated by the political 
economy literature; factors that play a role in determining tariff structures may be 
expected to influence tariff changes. Our model relates the change in tariffs to the 
change in imports, the import elasticity of demand and a manufacturing dummy 
variable. This is a very restricted set of variables, but only these are available in the 
data. The results of this specification are far weaker than the results for the estimation 
of the G-H model; there is only limited evidence that political economy factors 
influence African trade policy reform.  
 
It may be that we find little evidence of political economy influences on trade policy in 
the 1990s because these factors had ‘pre-determined’ the pattern of protection (before 
our sample observations) while the reforms implemented were essentially technocratic. 
In other words, the reforms may have been administrative adjustments reducing the 
level and dispersion of tariffs in a manner that preserved relative rates of protection. 
The principal motivation or impetus for reform in the 1990s came from the World Bank 
(and other donors with lending programmes) and commitments through membership of 
the WTO. These suggest technocratic reforms to reduce the distortions associated with 
tariffs, and neither necessitates dramatic reforms. To the extent that African countries 
have been required to reduce tariffs under WTO commitments this only relates to 
bound rates, which are typically above the applied rates. While the World Bank may 
have pushed for significant tariff reductions, countries often implement less reform than 
proposed (Greenaway and Morrissey, 1993), although Morrissey (2004) argues that 
conditionality has influenced trade liberalisation: whilst it is true that reforms 
(conditions) are rarely fully implemented within the (relatively) short period of a 
specific programme, over the longer term most developing countries have implemented 
significant policy reforms in the direction advocated by World Bank and donor 
conditionality. Morrissey and Nelson (2003, 2004) argue that global institutions such as 
the WTO and World Bank influence the process of trade policy learning and reform, for 
example by providing information on policy knowledge and choices (e.g. on which 
policies have worked elsewhere), on policy transfer and supporting implementation. If 
the pattern of tariff changes during the 1990s was responding to such external 
influences it would be essentially technocratic in nature. 
     4   
The paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the 
political economy literature, especially the G-H model, to derive the main predictions. 
Section 3 applies the political economy model to data on tariff structure for five African 
countries (Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Tanzania and Tunisia) for periods between 1990 
and 2002. As this analysis relates only to tariff structure, Section 4 considers if 
available political economy variables offer any explanation for tariff changes; here we 
have data for a slightly different sample of six countries (Algeria, Ethiopia, Egypt, 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) for various years within the period 1992-2003. Section 5 
examines descriptive statistics for the pattern of tariff changes, considering the 
proposition that a technocratic reform would reduce the average tariff and dispersion of 
rates while preserving the distribution, adding Morocco to the sample used in the 
previous section. Section 6 presents the conclusion and discusses some implications. 
 
2   POLITICAL ECONOMY MODELS OF TARIFF STRUCTURE 
Very broadly speaking, there are two approaches to formally characterizing the political 
economy of trade policy, namely referendum models and lobbying models.
1  While 
referendum models may be a useful reduced form for analyzing the public politics of 
trade policy, most current research emphasizes that, especially in the absence of a major 
role for trade in public politics, lobbying models are in some sense more basic as a 
framework for empirical work.  Because the overall literature is immense, and well-
served by survey papers, we can focus on that part of the literature directly relevant for 
the research reported here.
2  Thus, we will briefly discuss the theoretical literature on 
lobbying and then its empirical implementation. 
 
Lobbying models seek to formalize the group-theoretic tradition from political science, 
in which rational individuals use real resources to pursue their preferred policies.  This 
involves specifying an underlying economy, from which we can derive the effects of 
policy changes as comparative static exercises, and a political mechanism via which 
citizen-agents pursue their preferred policies (Hillman, 1989).  The early literature was 
bifurcated between models in which the political decision-maker was active, but 
citizen-agents were not, and models in which citizen-agents were active put the political 
                                                                    
1 There are a very small number of papers that seek to analyze political economies in which citizens vote 
for candidates and then lobby for policy.  To the best of our knowledge, none of these have been used as 
a framework for empirical work. 
2 Among the recent surveys, Helpman (1997) is an admirably clear introduction to the theoretical 
literature, while Gawande and Krishna (2003) does a fine job characterizing the current state of empirical 
research.     5  
decision-maker was not.  A standard reference of the first sort is Hillman’s (1982) 
application of the Stigler-Peltzman model, in which the underlying political process is 
represented by a political support function which acts as a constraint on the political 
decision-maker’s policy choice.  The second sort of model is well-represented by 
Findlay and Wellisz (1982) who consider a game between two groups (a capital owning 
group and a labour owning group) to determine the tariff when faced by a state that 
passively registers the levels of lobbying. 
 
The literature on endogenous determination of trade policy experienced a major 
advance with the publication of Grossman and Helpman (1994) ‘Protection for Sale’.  
G-H characterize the lobbying process as a common agency problem with groups as the 
principals and the political decision-maker as the common agent.  This common agency 
problem is analyzed as a Bernheim and Whinston (1986) menu auction.  That is, each 
group submits a menu of all feasible tariff schedules with the specific transfer it is 
willing to make to the decision-maker for each of the tariff schedules should that 
specific schedule be adopted.  The government then selects a specific tariff schedule 
that maximizes its objective function. 
 
In addition to the menu auction lobbying model, G-H assume an underlying model 
characterized by a specific factor production structure in which labour is the only inter-
sector mobile factor; a freely traded Ricardian good which serves as the numeraire; and 
quasi-linear preferences in which the Ricardian good is the linear good. The 
government’s objective function is taken to be a weighted average of aggregate welfare 
and political contributions from organised sectors of the economy. Given the 
underlying economy, the government’s maximisation yields trade taxes that satisfy the 
following modified Ramsey Rule: 
 



















                                                                 (1)                                 
 
Where in respect of industry i,  i t is the tariff,  i X  is output,  i M  is imports, i ε  is the 
elasticity of demand,  i I  is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the industry 
is organised and 0 for an unorganised industry,  L α  is the proportion of the population 
that is organised and finally a is the weight the government attaches to population 
welfare relative to political contributions. This equation suggests that industries that are     6   
politically organised ( ) 1 = i I  will receive positive rates of protection whilst industries 
that are politically unorganised will receive negative rates of protection.
3  
 
As a structural framework, this has the additional virtue of associating cross-sectional 
variance in protection with a relatively small number of (mostly) readily available data.  
That is, we should observe cross-section deviation from free trade in opposite directions 
for organised and unorganised industries. The size of this deviation is determined by 
the three key variables: output, imports and the import price elasticity of demand. 
Firstly, as output increases the benefits to lobbies from protection are higher. Secondly, 
as import volumes fall the costs of deviation from free trade are lower. Finally, a lower 
(or more inelastic) industry price elasticity of demand means a lower dead-weight cost 
to society of deviating from free trade. The implication is that the government will 
favour organised industries with high levels of output, low levels of imports and price 
inelastic demand.  
 
Whilst outputs, imports, and elasticity of demand are all, in principle, readily 
observable, political organization of the industry is a different story.
4  Even under the 
best of conditions, these data will not be available.  The ‘best of circumstances’ in this 
case is the US, where there are publicly available data on spending by political action 
committees (PACs).  Thus, Goldberg and Maggi (1999), applying the model to US 
data, use data on PAC spending to derive a threshold that identifies a sector as 
politically organised.
5 The most significant application of the G-H model to a 
developing country is Mitra et al (2001) for Turkey, where data from the Turkish 
Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TUSIAD) to capture political organisation. 
They generate estimates for two of the key parameters implicit in the model: the weight 
the government attaches to population welfare relative to political contributions, and 
the proportion of the population politically organised. The authors conclude that the 
data supported the model well. We also aim to estimate these parameters.   
Unfortunately, in the African context, we are neither in the best of circumstances nor 
                                                                    
3 Note that, unlike early pluralist literature in political science and the literature that grew out of the 
pioneering work of Findlay and Wellisz (1982), but like the later (‘critical’) pluralist work such as the 
Schattschneider (1935) classic on the politics of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, G-H explicitly incorporate 
asymmetric organization. 
4 It is worth noting that, contrary to the usual Olsonian collective action logic common in economic 
research, organized sectors in the PfS model are perfectly organized (i.e. they tax specific capital owning 
households optimally for political activity). 
5 Even here, the data are far from ideal.  The model assumes that the resources are spent on trade policy, 
but the data refer simply to total spending.  Thus, exactly the same data would be used to examine, say, 
agricultural price support or changes in the corporate income tax.     7  
even in the circumstances of Mitra et al (2001).  Interpreting I as an indicator variable 
for ‘access’ (to political influence), and assuming that once access is secured groups 
can tax their members optimally for political purposes, we consider alternatives 
suggested by the earlier empirical literature on trade policy. 
 
An important early paper by Richard Caves (1976) identified:
6 
•  The Interest Group model emphasises the factors that affect the capacity of the 
group to organize for political action.  Deriving from Olson’s (1965) analysis of 
collective action problems, this work stresses the need to overcome the free-rider 
problem implicit in interest group formation.
7 For large interest groups the free-
rider problem would be difficult to avoid, inhibiting the resulting power of the 
lobby. For this reason interest groups with a high degree of geographic and seller 
concentration would be more successful in capturing rents. Therefore the cross-
industry pattern of protection is likely to be positively related to these two 
variables.  In our context, sectors in which the number of workers per firm is large 
will be taken to indicate sectors in which the collective action problem is most 
easily overcome. 
•  The Adding Machine model suggests that political influence flows from voting 
strength. Thus, the greater the number of firms and/or employees in a sector, the 
more votes available for the politician. In this context, a large sector implies 
greater access. 
 
Both of these have implications for our access interpretation of the indicator variable 
(I). In our implementation we will consider several variables implied by the interest 
group and adding machine models in much the same way as Goldberg and Maggi 
(1999) use lobbying expenditure to identify organized and unorganized sectors. 
 
Baldwin (1986) also identified two other models with implications for the interpretation 
of our results:
8 
•  The Status Quo model. Building on Corden’s (1974) conservative social welfare 
function and Lavergne’s (1983) quantitative historical study of the US tariff, this 
model assumes that politicians are averse to changes in the income distribution. 
Thus, this model predicts that protection should be related positively to past levels 
of protection, import penetration and variables related to the ability of workers to 
adjust, such as the proportion of older unskilled workers. 
                                                                    
6 Caves, who was using Canadian data, also considered a ‘national policy’ model rooted in the details of 
Canadian tariff history. 
7 Depending on the underlying model of the economy, these might be factor-based or industry-based 
groups.  It is conventional in the G-H model to refer to the groups as industry-based, but, of course, the 
‘industries’ and the derived interests are tied to the factors specific to that industry. 
8 Baldwin also discussed a variety of models based on evaluations of relative welfare cost (the ‘equity 
concern model’); relative adjustment cost (the ‘adjustment assistance model’); and expected magnitude 
of change (the ‘comparative costs model’).  Our data will not permit us to address any of these 
hypotheses.      8   
•  The International Bargaining model.  With roots in Helleiner’s (1977) comment 
on Caves original paper, the notion here is that tariff schedules reflect 
considerations of international bargaining and relative power.
9  We will explicitly 
consider a related hypothesis, that technocratic reforms supported by 
international agencies as part of more general liberalizations play a role, and one 
might see these as the small country equivalent of the international bargaining 
model. 
 
Interestingly, just as the adding machine and interest group models imply different 
signs for variables related to industry size, the status quo and technocratic reform 
models imply different signs for the relationship between sectors with high initial tariffs 
and degree of reduction.  The status quo model predicts that sectors with high initial 
tariffs will experience smaller proportional cuts than sectors with low initial tariffs.  By 
contrast, and building on research on the relatively robust welfare properties of 
concertina tariff reforms (e.g. Thomas and Nash, 1991; Falvey, 1994; Neary, 1998; 
Anderson and Neary, 2007; Kreickemeier and Raimondos-Møller, 2006), the 
technocratic reform hypothesis predicts that sectors with high initial tariffs will 
experience larger proportional reductions. 
 
3  POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TARIFFS IN AFRICA 
Our application of the G-H model is non-standard as the aim is to explain the relative 
pattern of protection, using tariffs across sectors, rather than explaining 
protection/disprotection across sectors. In the data, we have no sectors with import 
subsidies (disprotection) and can only address relative tariff protection as there are no 
data on non-tariff barriers (although, has observed above, most of the countries had 























γ π + + + =
+ 1
                               (2) 
 
Equation (2) is estimated using OLS to estimate the coefficientsγ andδ . The second 
term on the right hand side includes the political organisation indicator variable. 
Because  ) , 0 [ ∞ ∈ a and  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ L α  δ should be positive and γ should be negative, but 
their sum should be positive. This is implied so that protection is positive for organised 
                                                                    
9 In fact, Helleiner’s original point was somewhat different: since developing countries at the time did not 
actively participate in the GATT, tariffs on goods of primary interest to developing countries would be 
higher than those actively negotiated on by industrial countries.     9  
sectors and negative for unorganised sectors. Negative tariffs (import subsidies) are not 
typically observed, so it is possible thatγ  is positive (in our data it is always non-
negative). In assessing the importance of political organisation, we require that  0 > δ  
(and significant) as this would be sufficient to ensure that organised sectors have higher 



























               
 
It is thus possible to derive estimates for: a, the weight the government attaches to 
welfare  relative to lobbies (contributions);  L α , the proportion of the population 
politically organised;
10 andβ , the weight that the government attaches to population 
welfare (which is distinct from the relative weight, a). 
 
The major difficulty in applying the G-H model empirically is how to identify whether 
an industry is politically organised. As we have no data on business associations, such 
as used by Mitra et al (2001), three proxy measures of political organisation are 
considered. 
The Number of Establishments The first proxy is based on the number of 
establishments within each sector (unfortunately we have no data on industrial 
concentration). According to Olsen (1965), ceteris paribus the more establishments 
in a sector the greater the resources devoted to lobbying and so the greater the 
potential for political influence, although inefficient lobbying may result as 
establishment members may be prone to free riding (which serves to undermine 
lobbying efforts). Although the collective action problem suggests that sectors with 
more establishments may be less effective in lobbying, assuming a correlation 
between number of establishments and total sector size, we favour the premise that 
sectors with more establishments will have more political influence over policy 
makers in African countries.
11 For each country a threshold is set based on the 
mean, median and upper quartile of the distribution; sectors are classified as 
politically organised if the number of establishments is greater than this threshold 
level.  
The Number of Employees Following the same line of argument for the number of 
establishments, an alternative measure of sector size (as a proxy for political 
influence) is employees per sector. The argument is that the larger the number of 
employees the more likely it is that the sector has political influence on policy 
makers. Again a threshold is set for each country based on the mean, median and 
upper quartile. If the number of employees in a sector is above this threshold the 
sector is classified as politically organised. To the extent that the number of 
                                                                    





) = L  
11   This is not implausible as the data largely omits microenterprises and one could expect sectors 
with more formal enterprises to be relatively more influential.     10   
employees is correlated with the number of unskilled employees, this may also be a 
proxy for the ‘social justice’ model mentioned above. 
The Ratio of Employees to Establishments The third measure takes advantage of 
data on establishments and employment. The greater the ratio of employees to 
establishments the more likely it is that the sector includes large firms and therefore 
political influence (and the potential for collective lobbying) is greater. Again 
thresholds are set based on the average, median and upper quartile. If the ratio of 
employees to establishments is greater than these threshold limits the sector is 
classified as politically organised.  
 
The data are obtained from the World Bank Trade and Production Database and are 
available for Kenya, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Tanzania.
12 This dataset uses the 
ISIC 3-digit manufacturing classification which includes approximately 27 sectors 
between 1992 and 2002 (this varies for each country, as discussed below). For each 
product line data are available on output, imports and applied tariffs, and for the 
measures used to classify political organisation. The import demand elasticities are 
taken from Kee et al (2005), but for Egypt, Kenya and Tanzania these are 
supplemented with our own import demand elasticity estimates (these are from HS 
classifications, related to the ISIC sectors using the concordance in Table A1).
13 
 
For each country, tariffs do not change annually. For example, in Tanzania we have 
different tariff observations in 1995 and 1997 (the 1995 tariffs were set in 1994, and 
tariffs changed again in 2000, but the data used here covers 1995-97) and assume that 
tariffs in 1996 are the same as those in 1995. As the focus is on the cross-industry 
pattern of protection, not liberalisation, and the explanatory variables are measured for 
the period prior to and including when tariffs change, instead of using annual 
observations as a dimension in our panel we use ‘tariff time’ (periods during which 
tariffs are unchanged). Thus t = 0 is defined as the years when initial tariffs prevail 
(1995 for Tanzania as there are no prior observations) and t = 1 is the period up to when 
tariffs change (1996-97 for Tanzania). Assuming there are data for 28 sectors for each 
period of tariff time the constructed dataset will include 28×t observations. In reality 
not all of the 28 sectors are available and, as the number of ‘tariff times’ differ, total 
observations are different for each country.
14 Although Tunisia and Morocco did not 
liberalise their tariffs over the period, in fact to a certain degree tariffs increased, this 
                                                                    
12URL:http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/TRADE/0,,contentMDK:20098489~
menuPK:167374~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:239071,00.html 
13  Details available in Jones (2008). 
14   The following sectors are not available for each country: Tanzania 354, 384, 390; Egypt 322, 
324; Morocco 324, 353, 354; Kenya 324, 354, 371, 372; Tunisia 323, 324, 331, 332, 341, 342, 353, 
354, 372, 381, 385.     11  
should not have any effect on the results as the G-H model is explaining the cross-
industry pattern of protection, not trade liberalisation.  
 
We average the data on imports and output over tariff time, i.e. for the years up to and 
including the change in tariffs. For example, for Tanzania, imports for 1997 (the second 
observation of tariffs) is the average level of imports per sector over 1996 and 1997 (the 
unit of ‘tariff time’), and similarly for output. The import elasticity of demand is 
assumed to be time-invariant and constant for each unit of ‘tariff time’. The data used 
to create the political organisation variables use the data on establishments and the 
number employees for the relevant tariff period. For some countries there are only two 
units of ‘tariff time’, so the data available for estimation is limited.  The countries 
covered differ by income level and the share of manufacturing in the economy, 
although all except Tanzania have relatively developed, by African standards, 
manufacturing sectors. We begin with the two SSA countries and then consider the 
three, relatively developed, North African countries. 
 
Kenya 
Table 1 reports the results for Kenya with the mean threshold for the political 
organisation measures (the other thresholds yield broadly similar results; full results are 
reported in Appendix Table A2). Panel A uses the elasticities estimated by Kee et al 
(2005). Remarkably similar results are obtained using our estimates of elasticities (panel 
B).  The R
2 values across each specification (for different measures of political 
organisation) lie in the range 0.09-0.22 suggesting that only a small part of the cross-
industry variation in tariffs can be explained by the variables included to represent the 
G-H model.  
 
The coefficient estimate ofγ  is statistically significant (for each specification, and 
almost identical in magnitude for the establishments and employees measures for all 
threshold criteria), but has a positive sign. This suggests that politically unorganised 
sectors receive positive rates of protection, contradicting the prediction of the strict G-H 
model (they should receive negative rates of protection), but is to be expected as all 
observations have positive tariffs. The estimates for δ  are also statistically significant 
for each specification and tend to be larger thanγ . This suggests that organised sectors 
receive greater levels of protection compared to unorganised sectors, as we would 
expect. The exception is when political organisation is measured by the ratio of     12   
employees to establishments, where the coefficient estimate for δ  is negative and 
significant (for each threshold), although slightly lower in absolute value than γ in these 
regressions. This ‘firm size’ measure does not support the prediction that organised 
sectors receive positive rates of protection, suggesting that sector size may be politically 
more relevant than firm size, or that the ratio is a poor proxy for political organisation. 
 
 
Table 1: Political Economy Model Estimates for Kenya 
 
Panel A 
 Measure (mean)  γ  δ  Constant R
2 
Establishments 0.0001**  0.004** 0.578***  0.16 
se 0.00004  0.002  0.032     
Employees 0.0001**  0.001  0.599***  0.09 
se 0.00004  0.004  0.033     
Ratio 0.0024***  -0.002**  0.575***  0.21 
se 0.001  0.001  0.031     
 
Panel B 
Measure (mean)  γ  δ  Constant R
2 
Establishments 0.0001**  0.004** 0.577***  0.17 
se 0.00004  0.002  0.032     
Employees 0.0001**  0.002  0.598***  0.09 
se 0.00005  0.003  0.033     
Ratio 0.0009*  -0.0008*  0.591***  0.14 
se 0.0005  0.0005  0.031     
 
Panel C 
Measure (mean)  Elasticity 1  Elasticity 2 
  a  β  αL a  β  αL 
Establishments 230  0.996 0.022  180  0.994  0.018 
Employees 695  0.999 0.064  568  1.002  0.052 
Ratio  -436 1.002 -1.043 -1213  1.001 -1.109 
 
 
Notes:  There are 48 observations for each model, comprising 24 Sectors in two tariff periods (which 
are 1991, 1992-00). Standard errors (se) given below coefficient estimates; *** indicates 
significant at the 1 per cent level, ** significance at the 5 per cent level, and * at the 10 per cent 
level. Panel A and Elasticity 1 in Panel C based on Kee et al (2005) estimates of import demand 




The parameter estimates of a, β and  L α  for Kenya are reported in Table 1, panel C. 
When political organisation is measured by the ratio we get perverse results, due to the 
negative coefficient estimate of δ  for each threshold. For the other measures of 
political organisation the results are more plausible (and are similar whichever elasticity 
estimates are used). The parameter a, the weight the government attaches to welfare     13  
relative to political contributions, is very high for each measure of political 
organisation; for the most consistent estimates using establishments the value is around 
200.
15 The estimate ofβ , the weight attached to population welfare in the government’s 
objective function, is almost unity (consistent with the very high value for a); this is 
easier to interpret as a value of 1 implies all weight is attached to the population. The 
estimate for  L α  - the proportion of the population politically organised - tends to be 
very small for each measure, between two and six per cent of the population. With this 
low estimate it is not surprising that the government appears to place such a high 
weight on ‘population’ welfare.  
 
 
Table 2: Political Economy Model Estimates for Tanzania 
 
Panel A 
Measure (median)  γ  δ  Constant R
2 
Establishments  0.0003*** 0.0204** 0.386***  0.23 
se  0.0001  0.008   0.023    
Employees  0.019  -0.019 0.403*** 0.15 
se  0.016  -0.016   0.023    
Ratio  0.018  -0.018 0.399*** 0.16 
se  0.012  -0.012   0.023    
 
Panel B 
Measure (median)  γ  δ  Constant R
2 
Establishments  0.0002*** 0.033*** 0.381***  0.26 
se  0.0001  0.01   0.023    
Employees  0.01 -0.02  0.406***  0.13 
se  0.02  -0.03   0.023    
Ratio  0.01 -0.01  0.404***  0.14 
se  0.01  -0.02   0.024    
 
Panel C 
Measure (median)  Elasticity 1  Elasticity 2 
  a  β  αL  a  β  αL 
Establishments  49.03 0.98 0.01 30.13 0.97 0.01 
Employees  -53.93 1.02 -1.02 -61.24 1.02 -0.64 
Ratio  -57.51 1.02 -1.02 -69.14 1.01 -0.64 
 
 





The results for Tanzania based on median thresholds are reported in Table 2 (the mean 
thresholds give similar results, full details in Appendix Table A3), using the Kee et al 
(2005) elasticities in Panel A and our own in Panel B. Only the ‘establishments’ 
                                                                    
15 Mitra et al (2001) estimate a at 76 in 1983 and 104 in 1990 for Turkey.     14   
measure provides consistent results: the estimates of γ  are statistically significant, 
albeit positive; the estimates of δ  with this measure are significant and positive using 
the mean and median threshold. As estimated δ is greater than that of γ , organised 
sectors (as measured by size) receive more protection than unorganised sectors.  
 
The derived G-H parameters are shown in panel C; the results for a and  L α  are not 
robust except for the establishments measure, although β is fairly consistently close to 
unity. The ‘preferred’ parameter estimates are those based on the significant and 
consistent coefficient estimates (establishment measure and median threshold). The 
government attaches almost all weight to population welfare, with an estimate of 0.98 
for  β . The proportion of the population politically organised is estimated at only one 
per cent. Although the results are generally weaker than for Kenya, the general 
implication is similar: population welfare appears most important to the government 
and sector size rather than firm size appears to influence relative rates of protection. 
 
Egypt 
The results for Egypt based on our estimated elasticities are presented in Table 3; the 
elasticities estimated by Kee et al (2005) yielded insignificant estimates (full details in 
Appendix Table A4). Table 2 reports results for all measures and thresholds yielding 
significant coefficient estimates. These are all positive forγ , suggesting that 
unorganised sectors receive positive rates of protection. In the two cases when the 
estimate of δ is significant (employees/median and ratio/quartile) it is positive, and 
organised sectors receive greater protection than unorganised sectors. Using these 
estimates, the G-H parameter estimate of a is 7-17, for β  it is 0.9 and for  L α  it is 5-
12% of population organised (Panel C). Although the weights (a and β) are lower, the 
qualitative results are similar to Kenya and Tanzania: the government values welfare 
more than political access (as measured) and a small proportion of the population is 
politically organised. As ratio provides significant and consistent coefficient estimates, 
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Table 3: Political Economy Model Estimates for Egypt 
 
Panel A 
Threshold  Measure  γ  δ  Constant R
2 
Median  Establishments  0.009*** -0.004 0.721*  0.19 
se  0.003 -0.033 0.37     
Employees  0.007*** 0.111***  0.248***  0.97 
  
se  0.001 0.003  0.067     
Quartile  Establishments  0.009*** -0.022 0.743*  0.19 
se  0.003 -0.1 0.38     
Employees  0.009*** -0.028 0.743*  0.19 
se  0.003 -0.11 0.37    
Ratio  0.007*** 0.046*** 0.311 0.48 
  
se  0.002 0.009 0.29    
 
Panel B 
Threshold Measure  Parameter  Estimates 
      a  β  αL 
Median  Establishments  -84.07 1.012 -0.740 
Employees  6.75 0.871  0.047    
Ratio  86.99 0.989 0.043 
Quartile  Establishments  -36.28 1.028 -0.318 
Employees  -28.25 1.037 -0.248    
Ratio  16.95 0.944 0.117 
 
Notes: As for Table 1; all estimates based on ‘elasticity 2’ (own estimates). There are 52 observations, 





Table 4: Political Economy Model Estimates for Morocco 
 
Threshold/Measure  γ  δ  Constant R
2 
Mean  Establishments  0.015 -0.008 0.765*** 0.04 
se 0.012  0.012  0.053     
Employees  0.018 -0.012 0.754*** 0.05 
se 0.012  0.012  0.055     
Ratio 0.012***  -0.011*  0.779***  0.07 
  
se 0.004  0.006  0.048     
Quartile Establishments  0.016 -0.01 0.759***  0.04 
se 0.012  0.01  0.055     
Employees 0.018  -0.01  0.755***  0.05 
se 0.012  0.01  0.055     
Ratio 0.012***  -0.01*  0.778***  0.07 
  
se 0.004  0.006  0.048     
 
 
Notes: As for Table 6.1 (no elasticity estimates available from Chapter 3). No parameter estimates as 
all coefficient estimates are insignificant or inconsistent. There are 100 observations, comprising 
25 Sectors in 4 tariff periods (which are 1992, 1993-97, 1998-00 and 2001) 
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Morocco 
The results for Morocco are reported in Table 4 for the mean and quartile thresholds 
(full results are in Appendix Table A5). There is no evidence that organised sectors 
receive greater levels of protection compared to unorganised sectors; only for the ratio 
measure are the coefficient estimates significant, but δ  has a negative sign. There is 
also little evidence that politically unorganised sectors receive positive protection; only 
two measures of political organisation provide statistically significant and positive 
estimates. As coefficient estimates are only significant for two specifications, and in 
both cases δ is negative, the G-H parameters are not estimated for Morocco. 
 
 
Table 5: Political Economy Model Estimates for Tunisia 
 
Panel A 
Measure (mean)  γ  δ  Constant R
2 
Establishments 0.0028  0.0097*  0.625***  0.10 
se 0.0019  0.005  0.021     
Employees 0.0061**  -0.005  0.627***  0.08 
se 0.003  0.003  0.021     
Ratio 0.0034*  0.0034  0.629***  0.05 





Measure (mean)  Parameter Estimates 
   a  β  αL 
Establishments 103.91  0.9905 0.2860 
Employees -210.93  1.0048  -1.2872 
Ratio 291.65  0.9966  0.9593 
 
 
Notes: As for Table 1 (no own elasticity estimates). There are 68 observations, comprising 17 Sectors 
in 4 tariff periods (which are 1991, 1992-95, 1996-98 and 1999-02) 
 
Tunisia 
The results for Tunisia are reported in Table 5, Panel A for coefficients and Panel B for 
derived parameters, using the mean threshold (the median and quartile thresholds give 
poor results, see Appendix Table A6). There is some evidence that organised sectors 
receive higher protection; but results are less consistent than for Kenya (for no measure 
are  γ and δ both significant). Insofar as any inference can be drawn, sector size 
(employees) appears to influence relative protection, as does firm size (as measured by 
ratio). The derived parameter estimates (Panel B) are inconsistent for the employees 
measure (δ < 0) and, although plausible for the other measures, are based on at least     17  
some insignificant coefficient estimates. The results for β are fairly consistent and 
similar to all other countries, again suggesting that, if anything, it is welfare (interpreted 
in some way by government reflecting sector size) not lobbies that influence the pattern 
of protection. The estimated a is fairly large, and for the establishments measure is 
identical to the estimate of Mitra et al (2001) of 104 in 1990 for Turkey, and the fact 
that it is much lower than for Kenya is consistent with the proportion of the population 
organised appearing much higher (at almost 30%). 
 
Interpretation 
In general the G-H model does not fit the data: one or both of the coefficient estimates 
are insignificant in most specifications for most countries, and/or organised sectors 
were estimated to receive negative protection (contrary to the model); indeed it was 
statistically invalid to estimate the model parameters for Morocco. There is no 
empirical support for the strict G-H model, but this is unsurprising: firms in Africa are 
not organised in the manner posited (at a sector level), they do not make political 
contributions to parties and governments are not viewed as weighting ‘population’ (as 
broadly defined in G-H) welfare. The lack of evidence that unorganised sectors receive 
negative rates of protection is simply be because the data has positive protection for all 
sectors (i.e. there are no negative tariffs for the data to predict). 
 
Rejecting the strict G-H model does not imply that the political economy variables, 
specifically a sector’s political access (organisation), do not influence the cross-industry 
pattern of protection. Although we only have proxy measures, there is evidence that 
organised sectors receive higher protection, insofar as a proxy for sector size can be 
interpreted as a measure of political organisation. Perhaps a more appropriate 
interpretation, consistent with alternative approaches such as the ‘adding up’ model, is 
that a measure of sector size does appear to be associated with relative protection. One 
result does appear with the greatest frequency: larger sectors (measured by number of 
establishments and/or employees) benefit from higher tariffs. However, the firm size 
proxy, average employees per establishment, is rarely significant, suggesting at least 
that there is no evidence that sectors with larger firms are better able to lobby for 
protection (the possible exception is Egypt). Firm size does not influence protection, 
suggesting that governments do not attach weight to firm lobbying (at least in setting 
relative tariffs), but population interpreted as sector size (i.e. the population of 
producers and/or employees) does appear to affect protection.     18   
For the specifications that lend some support to the G-H model it was possible to derive 
estimates of the model parameters for four countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Egypt and 
Tunisia). These results are quite consistent where available: governments appear to 
attach the greatest weight to ‘population’ welfare, either absolutely or relative to 
political contributions, consistent with only a small proportion of the population 
appearing to be politically organised (given that all sectors receive protection). As the 
significant measures of organisation tend to be measures of sector size, the implication 
is that relatively larger sectors are more protected. Insofar as domestic production 
capacity and employment (largely of unskilled labour) should be correlated with sector 
size, the population the government favours is that of producers, i.e. it is producer (or 
labour) welfare that is weighted rather than consumer welfare. This interpretation is 
consistent with the ‘adding machine’ model. 
 
4   POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TARIFF CHANGES 
We now consider if the variables we have available can help to explain (i.e. are 
determinants of) tariff changes, usually a slightly different sample of Algeria, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The data are classified using the Harmonised 
System (HS) and cover tariffs, imports and our estimated elasticities for up to 94 
sectors (Jones, 2008). The data on tariffs and imports are calculated as percentage 
changes over the relevant tariff period (‘tariff time’ as defined above). The change in 
tariffs is regressed on the change in imports, the elasticity of demand for imports, the 
initial level of tariffs and a manufacturing dummy variable (i.e. a dummy equal to 1 if 
the sector is manufacturing, and zero otherwise). These explanatory variables are used 
to proxy for political economy characteristics: change in imports is a proxy for import 
penetration (which we cannot measure directly due to the unavailability of output data 
for each of the sectors); elasticities are suggested by G-H; lagged tariffs are suggested 
by the ‘Status Quo’ model; the manufacturing dummy helps identify if relative 
protection differs between manufacturing (firm lobbies) and non-manufacturing 
(mostly agriculture). As an added check we also perform a sensitivity analysis 
measuring the change in sector imports relative to the mean change.  
 
Empirical Specification 
There is no formal political economy model of tariff liberalisation so we adopt an ad 
hoc approach, similar to Caves (1976), of the following form: 
     19  
                   it i it it it it it D M ξ θτ λ ωε φ υ τ + + + + ∆ + = ∆ 0               (3)                                      
 
where the subscript i represents sectors and t represents the time period. We consider 
the percentage change in τ  (tariffs, which will be negative due to liberalisation) and M 
(imports); ε  is the elasticity of import demand for each sector, D is a dummy variable 
which equals one if a sector is classified as manufacturing and zero if a sector is 
classified as agricultural and  0 i τ is the initial level of tariffs. Our null hypotheses for the 
parameter estimates for each variable are as follows:  
The Change in Imports: The expected the sign of φ is ambiguous. An import 
penetration argument suggests that the greater the increase in imports prior to tariff 
reform the lower the expected reduction in tariffs, i.e.  φ > 0. Large increases in 
imports into a sector would send a worrying signal to the tariff-setting authority 
which may have a preference to protect domestic firms. However, if rising imports 
imply no domestic sector to protect, tariffs can be reduced more, i.e.  φ  < 0 (in a 
revenue neutral manner). 
The Import Elasticity of Demand: Given the Ramsey Rule, the more elastic is 
import demand (higherε ) the lower the tariff is likely to be and the less the concern 
regarding tariff reductions. If the government is more concerned about higher tariffs 
on sectors that face inelastic demand because of the distributional consequences, 
sectors facing elastic demand should see greater liberalisation of tariffs, i.e. ω < 0.  
The Manufacturing Dummy Variable: The expected sign of λ is ambiguous. 
Industrial concentration and infant industry arguments suggest that manufacturing 
sectors receive more protection than agricultural sectors, i.e. λ > 0 (lower tariff 
reduction). The tariff-setting authorities will wish to protect their manufacturing 
base from exposure to import competition. On the other hand, agriculture sectors 
may be the major source of export earnings and employ more unskilled labour, 
suggesting high tariffs (and low imports) to protect the export products, i.e. λ < 0. 
The Initial Level of Tariffs: If we assume technocratic reform, such as meeting 
WTO obligations, the higher the initial tariff the greater the proportionate reduction 
in tariffs, θ < 0 (because the change in tariffs is negative), or the initial tariff 
variable is insignificant. However, if political economy factors act so as to maintain 
the relative pattern of protection, and high initial tariffs indicate lobbies for 
protection, tariffs may proportionately be reduced least where initial tariffs are 
greatest, θ > 0.  
 
Because tariffs only change once or twice throughout the period investigated we again 
take advantage of the notion of ‘tariff time’ used above. For example, Tanzania altered 
its tariff structure in 1997, 2000 and 2003 (for the period covered in the data we are 
here using). We have three changes in tariffs for each industry; this means that the 
dimensions of the panel will be 94×3 observations. Because the import data is far more 
variable and available for each year we smooth the data by averaging the change in 
imports in the years prior to and including the year the change in tariffs took place.     20   
Table 6 summarises the data available for each country. The manufacturing dummy is 
constructed by assigning the value of 1 to industries that begin with codes 24 to 96, and 
0 for codes 01-23.  
 
Table 6: Data Availability for Tariff Changes 
 
Country Period  Tariff time  No of Sectors  Obs  Dates Liberalised 
Algeria  1992-02  3  94  282  1997, 2001, 2002 
Tanzania  1995-03  3  94  282  1997, 2000, 2003 
Uganda  1994-00 1  94 94  2000 
Ethiopia  1997-01 1  93 94  2001 
Kenya  1997-00 1  94 94  2000 




Table 7 provides descriptive statistics of the data used across sectors for each country. 
For example, the average (across sectors) initial tariff for Algeria is 27 per cent 
compared with 21 per cent post liberalisation; this equates to a reduction of 23 per cent. 
This tariff reduction in Algeria ‘follows’ an average percentage increase in imports 
(across sectors) of 69 per cent (in the period prior to the change in tariffs). There is no 
evident consistent relationship between the change in imports and the change in tariffs. 
These aggregate figures may however hide cross-sector differences, which we explore 
in the econometric analysis.  
 
Table 7 also provides statistics for manufacturing and agriculture separately. To the 
extent that manufacturing sectors in African economies tend to be more concentrated 
they may be able to overcome the collective action problem of forming an effective 
lobby (although the results in the previous section offer no support for this).  For this 
reason we may expect lower reductions in tariffs for manufacturing sectors. The 
descriptive statistics provide mixed evidence: the percentage change in average 
manufacturing tariffs for Egypt, Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya are lower than the 
percentage change in average agricultural tariffs.  However the opposite is the case for 
Algeria and Tanzania.  
     21   
 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Tariff Changes 
 
Statistics Across Sectors  Algeria Egypt  Uganda  Ethiopia  Kenya  Tanzania
Average Initial level of Tariffs 26.99  47.63  19.19  32.55  36.17  21.20 
Average Final level of Tariffs 20.67  34.45  10.78  20.86  17.10  15.11 
% Reduction in Average Tariffs  -23.44 -27.67 -43.84 -35.92  -52.71  -28.71 
Average % Change in Imports  68.54  24.32  234.75  184.85  0.39  38.33 
  
Average Initial level of Manufacturing Tariffs  26.72  31.39  17.45  29.52  36.17  19.93 
Average Final Level of Manufacturing Tariffs 19.78  23.57  10.17  19.93 17.53 13.99 
% Change in Average Manufacturing Tariffs -25.97 -24.92 -41.73 -32.49  -51.55  -29.81 
Average % Change in Manufacturing Imports 62.65  32.41  270.98 126.53  0.60  39.13 
  
Average Initial level of Agriculture Tariffs  27.78  94.97  24.26  41.27  39.71  24.88 
Average Final Level of Agriculture Tariffs 23.22  66.18  12.55  23.53  15.88  18.38 
% Change in Average Agricultural Tariffs -16.44  -30.32  -48.28  -42.98  -60.02  -26.15 
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The econometric results of estimating (3) for each country are reported in Table 8. 
Almost all of the coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant (except for the 
coefficient for the initial level of tariffs) suggesting that the political economy variables 
have had no evident effect on tariff liberalisation. The only country that does appear to 
show a partial relationship between the political economy variables and tariff 
liberalisation is Ethiopia. The coefficient φ is positive and significant but is fairly small. 
This suggests that increased imports are associated with lower tariff liberalisation. In 
addition the parameter λ  which is the coefficient associated with the manufacturing 
dummy variable is positive at 0.09. This suggests that manufacturing industries receive 
greater protection compared to the agricultural industries. The most significant result is 
the coefficient estimate for the initial level of tariffs. For Algeria, Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Tanzania the estimate is statistically significant and suggests that the higher the initial 
level of tariffs the greater the proportionate reduction in tariffs.  This is consistent with 
standard WTO principles (reduce the highest tariffs by the most and/or eliminate 
redundant tariffs) and suggests technocratic reform rather than reforms guided by 
political economy (status quo protection) influences. 
 
Table 8: Estimates for Tariff Changes 
 
Country Algeria  Egypt  Uganda  Ethiopia  Kenya  Tanzania 
Coefficient  ∆ τ  ∆ τ  ∆ τ  ∆ τ  ∆ τ  ∆ τ 
                   
∆M, φ  -0.0003 0.018 -0.0001 0.004** -0.049**  0.011 
   0.0005  0.017  0.0016  0.002 0.021 0.022 
Elasticity ω  -0.009 0.006 -0.015  0.003  0.145*  0.015 
   0.008 0.009 0.014  0.01  0.087  0.034 
D (Man =1) λ  -0.05 0.018  -0.055  0.093** 0.005 -0.003 
   0.036 0.038 0.063  0.043 0.0034  0.13 
Initial Tariffs θ  -0.008*** -0.0001 -0.015*** -0.0047***  -0.239  -0.017*** 
   0.001 0.0001  0.0033  0.001  0.2  0.0055 
Constant  0.25*** -0.195*** -0.084  -0.215*** -0.460**  0.399** 
   0.041 0.037 0.095  0.057  0.18  0.18 
Observations  279  94  94 93 94  282 
R
2  0.24  0.05  0.19 0.35 0.10 0.04 
Notes: *** indicates significant at the 1 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level. 
 
 
As a further test we estimate the following model: 
 
  it i it it it it it D M ξ θτ λ ωε φ υ τ + + + + ∆ + = ∆ 0
* *
                        (4) 
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The dependent variable is the ratio of the percentage change in sector tariffs to the 
percentage change in average tariffs, i.e. we consider the change in sector tariff relative 
to the average change. The independent variables are: the ratio of the percentage 
change in sector imports divided by the percentage change in average imports; the 
import demand elasticity; the manufacturing dummy variable; and the initial level of 
tariffs. The data is constructed for units of tariff time, so the data on imports is 
smoothed over the years prior to and including the year of liberalisation. For this model 
the dependent variable will be positive because it is the ratio of two negative numbers 
(coefficient estimates interpreted in the opposite way to Table 8).  
 
 
Table 9: Influences on Tariff Changes Relative to the Mean Change 
 
Country Algeria  Egypt  Uganda  Ethiopia  Kenya  Tanzania 
Coefficient  ∆ τ*  ∆ t*  ∆ t*  ∆ t*  ∆ t*  ∆ t* 
                    
∆M*, φ  0.0001 -0.0004  0  -0.00001** -0.01  -0.0002 
   0.0001 0.0004  0.00006  0.000004 0.012  0.0005 
Elasticity ω  0.092 -0.020 0.034  -0.001  0.02  0.068 
   0.13 0.031  0.033 0.041  0.02  0.17 
D (Man =1)  λ  1.169* -0.066 0.125  -0.266** -0.15*  -0.69 
   0.62  0.14  0.14 0.12 0.09 0.64 
Initial Tariffs θ  0.128*** 0.0005 0.034*** 0.0128*** 0.008**  -0.16*** 
   0.016  0.0003  0.007 0.003 0.003  0.03 
Constant  -4.523*** 0.704***  0.19  0.619***  0.81**  5.63*** 
   0.71  0.13  0.22 0.18 0.16 0.86 
Observations  279  94  94 93 94  282 
R
2  0.2 0.05 0.2  0.35 0.13 0.12 
 
Notes: *** indicates significant at the 1 percent level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent level. 
 
 
Table 9 reports the results: the political economy variables are again statistically 
insignificant for the majority of countries. The exception is again Ethiopia, which has 
significant estimates for the manufacturing dummy and the ratio for change in sector 
imports relative to change in average imports. It appears that political economy factors 
have had a minor impact on the liberalisation of tariffs. In addition, the coefficient 
estimates for the initial level of tariffs is positive and significant for four out of the six 
countries; the higher the initial level of tariffs the greater the proportionate reduction in     24   
tariffs. It would appear that this sort of technocratic reform is having a greater impact 
on liberalisation than political economy factors.  
 
5   TECHNOCRATIC TARIFF REFORMS? 
African countries have been encouraged to liberalise tariffs by external institutions, 
specifically the structural adjustment programmes promoted by the World Bank, and to 
a lesser extent through commitments under the WTO. Table 10 provides descriptive 
statistics for the six countries used in the previous section plus Morocco (data for 
Tunisia are unavailable). Tariffs are classified at the 8-digit level and taken from the 
COMTRADE database.
16 For each country we report: (1) the number of tariff lines, (2) 
the percentage of tariff lines equal to zero, (3) the average tariff, (4) the median tariff 
(5) the modal tariff, (6) the standard deviation, (7) the level of skewness, (8) the level of 
kurtosis, and (9) the coefficient of variation.  
 
The mean tariff, median tariff and mode tariff are measures of central tendency in the 
distribution. If the modal value is greater (lower) than the mean there is a greater 
number of large (small) tariff values. If the distance between the mode and the mean 
converges the distribution becomes thinner (less variability). In practice this variability 
is measured by the standard deviation. For a given mean tariff, a high standard 
deviation suggests that there are sub-sectors that face very different tariffs. If the 
standard deviation falls, for a given mean this variability is reduced. To provide 
evidence that technocratic policy has had a decisive impact on trade liberalisation we 
take advantage of the skewness, kurtosis and coefficient of variation statistics. The 
skewness statistic tells us about the asymmetry of the distribution of tariffs for each 
product line around the mean; if the distribution is skewed to the right it is positive, to 
the left it is negative, or if equal to zero it is symmetrical around the mean. The kurtosis 
statistic tells us about the “peakedness” of the probability distribution of tariffs for each 
product; if it is positive (leptokurtic) there is a greater likelihood of higher extreme 
values from the mean, if it is negative (platykurtic) there is less likelihood of extreme 
values from the mean, and if it is equal to zero we have a mesokurtic distribution. 
Finally, the coefficient of variation (CV) is a measure of dispersion of a probability 
distribution. It is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean and is useful 
in that it tells us the variability of tariffs from the average tariff. 
 
                                                                    
16   For Morocco the data for 2000, 2001 and 2002 is constructed from a 10-digit classification.      25   
 
 
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for Countries in the Sample 
 
Country/Stat  Tariff Lines  % of Tariffs = 0  Average Tariff  Median Tariff   Mode Tariff  SD  Skew  Kurt  CV 
Algeria 1993  6087  1.46  24.80  15  15  19.58  0.71  -0.82  0.79 
Algeria 1997  6238  1.64  24.16  15  45  16.74  0.21  -1.60  0.69 
Algeria 2001  5911  1.76  22.13  15  40  14.64  0.12  -1.60  0.66 
Egypt 1994  6045  0.26  33.82  20  10  128.59 21.39  480.74  3.80 
Egypt 1998  6069  0.20  28.05  20  10  130.56 21.33  472.56  4.66 
Egypt  2002  6686  0.52  20.48  15  10  17.82  7.16 192.37 0.87 
Ethiopia 1995  5309  2.58  28.74  20  5  23.88  0.83  -0.48  0.83 
Ethiopia 2001  5416  3.10  18.81  15  5  13.34  0.45  -1.22  0.71 
Kenya 1995  5761  3.40  35.12  31  50  13.33 -0.54  -0.14  0.38 
Kenya 2000  5924  3.66  17.71  15  15 11.46  0.75  -0.35  0.65 
Kenya 2001  5928  6.87  19.26  15  15 12.99  0.33  -0.66  0.67 
Morocco 1993  8467  0.86  24.51  23  40  13.10  -0.15  -1.22  0.53 
Morocco 1997  9114  0.03  23.98  25  35  30.17  6.66  59.03  1.26 
Morocco 2000*  16639  0.08  35.68  40  50  31.19  5.50  45.75  0.87 
Morocco 2001*  16593  0.06  34.04  40  50  24.85  4.89  53.24  0.73 
Morocco 2002 *  17379  0.06  33.63  40  50  24.36  4.59  49.38  0.72 
Tanzania 1994  5798  9.95  19.47  20 20  12.20  0.53  -0.02  0.63 
Tanzania 1997  7499  15.48  22.12  30 30  13.88  -0.37  -1.20  0.63 
Tanzania 2000  5286  2.36  16.19  20 25  9.00  -0.37  -1.63  0.56 
Uganda 1994  5306  4.26  17.07  10  10  9.06  0.36  -0.67  0.53 
Uganda 2000  5271  16.13  8.94  7  7  5.36  -0.22  -1.11  0.60 
 
Notes: Morocco changed its classification from 8 to 10 digits in 2000.     26   
 
To the extent that a normal distribution is mesokurtic with zero skewness, the 
distribution of tariffs is generally close to normal (at least after reforms). As can be 
seen the skewness and kurtosis estimates are close to zero for most of the countries, the 
exceptions being Egypt and Morocco. A technocratic reform would in all likelihood be 
fairly straightforward. For example, it might be that all tariffs are cut by a certain 
percentage, and perhaps that products with tariff peaks are cut by a higher percentage, 
or that in general all products are moved into a smaller number of lower (than initial) 
tariff rates/bands.  
 
If reforms are technocratic we would expect the skewness statistic and the coefficient of 
variation to decline, or at least stay fairly constant, as tariffs are reduced, while the 
kurtosis statistic should fall (there are fewer extreme values). The nine statistics in 
Table 10 are reported for each country in the years when tariffs change. For three of the 
countries there were periods when the average tariff increased. In Tanzania the average 
tariff increased from 19.5% in 1994 to 22% in 1997 but then fell to 16% in 2000; this 
was, in all likelihood, due to an increase in the number of tariff lines with higher values 
used in 1997 (demonstrated by a rise in the modal value) which subsequently fell back 
to the 1994 level in 2000. In Kenya tariffs averaged 35% in 1995 and then fell to an 
average of 17% percent in 2000, however tariffs increased to an average of 19% in 
2001. In Morocco the average tariff in 1993 was 24% which subsequently increased to 
33% in 2002. For the remaining countries the average tariff fell throughout the period; 
for example in Egypt the average tariff fell by approximately 13 percentage points 
whilst in Ethiopia and Uganda the average tariff fell by 10 percentage points.  
 
The technocratic reform proposition appears to be supported by the skewness and 
kurtosis statistics for each country. In general liberalisation is of the ‘across the board’ 
type. For example, Algeria’s skewness statistic is almost zero for each year; the 
coefficient of variation declines by approximately 10 percentage points, and the 
kurtosis statistic falls from -0.82 to -1.60 (it becomes more negative, so declining 
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Figure 1 illustrates the case of Ethiopia (recall the political economy variables 
performed reasonably well in this case), where each column is the percentage of tariff 
lines at that rate. The broadly normal distribution is maintained but there is a significant 
reduction in the number and range of tariff rates between 1995 and 2001. The 
distribution becomes more compressed with relatively fewer tariff lines above the 
mean. Appendix 2 provides similar figures for the three East African countries (Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda) which exhibit the same broad pattern. Interestingly the 
possibility of a technocratic reform may be even clearer for Egypt, where the kurtosis 
statistic falls dramatically, suggesting that tariff peaks were largely eliminated. In 
addition, the coefficient of variation for some countries fell dramatically, for example 
for Egypt from 4.66 in 1998 to 0.87 in 2002. Finally, the statistics for Morocco should 
be interpreted with care because we are comparing two classifications, one 8-digit and 
the other 10-digit. The overall picture is consistent with technocratic reforms that 
preserve the distribution but eliminate maximum tariffs and reduce the dispersion. 
 
6   CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Most African countries reduced tariffs during or since the 1990s. The impetus for 
import liberalisation came primarily from multilateral institutions; while they may 
propose an essentially technocratic structure of reductions, one would expect industry 
lobbies to try and influence the pattern of reductions, preserving at least their relative 
protection. This paper explores the extent to which political economy influences can be 
identified in the structure of tariffs and tariff reforms in Africa, even if the reforms were 
essentially technocratic. Data limitations restricted the set of explanatory variables that 
could be employed and required us to restrict attention to scheduled tariffs. Obviously 
this does not capture the true picture of protection for a sector. The widespread use of 
exemptions implies that actual protection for a sector may be less than suggested by 
scheduled tariffs, although there is no evidence that this significantly affects the broad 
pattern of relative protection. On the other hand, as some countries use ‘special duties’ 
to protect specific products, we may underestimate protection. Furthermore, we are 
unable to allow for non-tariff barriers, although most quantitative restrictions on 
imports had been removed by the 1990s (Morrissey, 2002) and our use of measures of 
the change in imports may control for this to some extent (as the presence of non-tariff 
barriers should restrict the growth of imports). Nevertheless, the structure of tariffs and 
tariff reforms is indicative of the cross-sector pattern of protection.     29  
The first piece of analysis in the paper was motivated by the Grossman and Helpman 
(1994) model and applied to data for five African countries. The model strictly 
interpreted does not fit the data, but this is unsurprising as it is not a model of African 
lobbying. There is evidence that a measure of sector size is associated with relative 
protection: larger sectors (measured by number of establishments and/or employees) 
benefit from higher tariffs. Firm size does not appear to influence protection (with the 
exception of Egypt), suggesting that governments do not attach weight to firm lobbying 
(at least in setting relative tariffs), but sector size (i.e. the population of producers 
and/or employees) does appear to affect protection. The implication is that relatively 
larger sectors, presumably more important for the economy, receive relatively greater 
protection. Insofar as domestic production capacity, export or import-competing, 
should be correlated with sector size, the population the government favours is that of 
producers, i.e. it is producer (or labour) welfare that is weighted rather than consumer 
welfare. These results support the ‘adding machine’ model rather than the ‘interest 
group’ model, where protection should be greater for sectors with lager firms (this is 
only supported in Egypt). 
 
The second piece of analysis was exploratory, testing for determinants of the pattern of 
tariff reductions (in six countries). We find no consistent evidence across the six 
countries that the pattern of tariff reductions is related to the change in imports, the 
import demand elasticity and the manufacturing dummy variable. The results suggest 
that these variables have almost no explanatory power, with the exception of Ethiopia 
(where tariffs were reduced least in sectors with rising imports and manufacturing 
receives greater protection than agriculture). A general interpretation implies that 
political economy factors do not appear to be affecting the reform of the tariff structure 
in these six African countries. The significant effect of the initial level of tariffs is 
consistent with technocratic reform (but contrary to predictions of the ‘status quo’ 
model): sectors with higher tariffs (assumed to imply having secured greater protection) 
experienced a greater percentage reduction in tariffs. This suggests that lobbies were 
unable to maintain their relative tariff protection. 
 
The final piece of analysis considered descriptive statistics for the distribution of tariffs 
and how this alters as tariff rates were changed for seven countries. The evidence 
supports a technocratic pattern of tariff reform: the level of tariffs was reduced, by more 
for products with higher initial tariffs, and the spread of the distribution was     30   
compressed. In general, reforms were associated with reductions in the skewness of the 
distribution (in particular away from extreme high values) and in the coefficient of 
variation, often dramatically. The support for technocratic reform is evident in all 
countries irrespective of whether political economy variables were significant. For 
example, Egypt exhibited no evidence of political economy influences whereas 
Ethiopia exhibited the most evidence for political economy influences on tariff reforms, 
but in both cases the pattern of reforms appeared technocratic. 
 
The lack of support for the political economy model does not in itself imply that such 
factors are unimportant. It may simply be that our data are inadequate to capture the 
political economy influences. It might be that political economy factors influenced the 
initial pattern of protection prior to trade liberalisation but because of data limitations it 
is impossible to verify this. In this context it is relevant that the technocratic reforms 
compressed the distribution of tariffs, with the greatest proportional reduction in the 
highest tariffs, so the relative pattern of tariff protection was not preserved. The 
analysis based on descriptive statistics does not demonstrate that political economy 
factors exert no influence on the pattern of trade liberalisation, but the results do 
suggest that any impact is minor.  
 
Our conclusion is not that political economy factors have not been important in African 
trade policy, although there is little evidence that they had an important influence on the 
pattern of tariff reductions implemented since the early 1990s. Observers of policy-
making in Africa know that lobbies do make representation to the government, 
especially the Ministries of Finance and Trade, and do seek protection (they resist tariff 
reductions). However, the lobbies are rarely organised on a sector-specific basis; they 
are more likely to represent broad interests such as Chambers of Commerce, 
manufacturing, traditional (agricultural) exporters, etc. Analysis motivated by the G-H 
model for African countries did yield some consistent qualitative implications: a 
relatively low proportion of the population are politically organised, in terms of 
lobbying for protection, and protection seems to be greater for larger sectors. As these 
are likely to be more important for the economy, and provide higher shares of formal 
private employment, the government may be attaching weight to the population of 
producers and wage labour in determining protection, rather than responding directly to 
particular (large) firms in organised lobbies. 
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The tariff reforms implemented since the early 1990s do appear to have eroded the 
degree of protection conferred on favoured sectors, as would be expected, but also 
eroded the degree of relative protection. Even if favoured sectors are more protected 
than other sectors, this is now true to a lesser degree than it was prior to the reforms. 
This is largely because the reforms were essentially technocratic, consistent with 
persuasive influence on implementation by external agencies, especially the World 
Bank and WTO. 
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Table A1: ISIC Product Description and Elasticity Concordance. 
 
ISIC   Product Description  Sector  Code 
311  Food products  Processed Food Beverages & 
Tobacco. 
3 
313  Beverages  Processed Food Beverages & 
Tobacco. 
3 
314  Tobacco  Processed Food Beverages & 
Tobacco. 
3 
321 Textiles  Textiles.  8 
322  Wearing apparel  except footwear  Textiles.  8 
323  Leather products  Footwear, Headgear etc.  9 
324  Footwear except rubber or plastics  Footwear, Headgear etc.  9 
331  Wood products  except furniture  Woods.  7 
332  Furniture  except metal  Woods.  7 
341  Paper and products  Woods.  7 
342  Printing and publishing  Chemicals.  5 
351 Industrial  chemicals  Chemicals.  5 
352 Other  chemicals  Chemicals.  5 
353  Petroleum refineries  Mineral Fuels.  4 
354  Misc petroleum and coal products  Mineral Fuels.  4 
355  Rubber products  Rubber & Hides.  6 
356  Plastic products  Stones, Pearls.  5 
361  Pottery  china  earthenware  Stones, Pearls.  10 
362  Glass and products  Stones, Pearls.  10 
369  Other non-metallic mineral 
products 
Stones, Pearls.  10 
371  Iron and steel  Metals.  11 
372 Non-ferrous  metals  Metals.  11 
381  Fabricated metal products  Metals.  11 
382  Machinery  except electrical  Machinery Mechanical 
Appliances. 
12 
383  Machinery  electric  Machinery Mechanical 
Appliances. 
12 
384 Transport  equipment  Vehicles.  13 
385  Professional and scientific 
equipment 
Precision Instruments.  14 
390  Other manufactured products Miscellaneous  Manufactures  16     36   
 
Table A2: Applying the G-H Model to Kenya 
      
Panel A  Measure  γ  δ  Constant R
2 
Mean Establishments  0.0000959**  0.00433** 0.578***  0.16 
se 0.000043  0.0021  0.032     
Employees 0.0000926**  0.00144  0.599***  0.09 
se 0.000045  0.0037  0.033     
Emp/Est 0.00240***  -0.00230**  0.575***  0.21 
  
se 0.00088  0.00088  0.031     
Median Establishments  0.0000922**  0.00206**  0.581***  0.18 
se 0.000042  0.00089  0.031     
Employees 0.0000924**  0.00197**  0.581***  0.17 
se 0.000043  0.0009  0.031     
Emp/Est 0.00583***  -0.00573***  0.568***  0.22 
  
se 0.0021  0.0021  0.031     
Quartile Establishments  0.0000949**  0.00407*  0.583***  0.15 
se 0.000043  0.0021  0.032     
Employees 0.0000925**  0.0014  0.599***  0.09 
se 0.000045  0.0037  0.033     
Emp/Est 0.00240***  -0.00230**  0.574***  0.20 
  
se 0.00089  0.00088  0.031     
 
Panel B  Measure  γ  δ  Constant R
2 
Mean Establishments  0.0000985**  0.00439** 0.577***  0.17 
se 0.000043  0.0021  0.032     
Employees 0.0000941**  0.0015  0.598***  0.09 
se 0.000045  0.0037  0.033     
Emp/Est 0.000923*  -0.000833*  0.591***  0.14 
  
se 0.00049  0.00049  0.031     
Median Establishments  0.0000901**  0.00199**  0.582***  0.18 
se 0.000042  0.0009  0.031     
Employees 0.0000906**  0.00190**  0.582***  0.17 
se 0.000043  0.0009  0.031     
Emp/Est 0.00196**  -0.00187*  0.587***  0.16 
  
se 0.00096  0.00096  0.031     
Quartile Establishments  0.0000974**  0.00414*  0.582***  0.16 
se 0.000043  0.0021  0.032     
Employees 0.0000941**  0.00145  0.598***  0.09 
se 0.000045  0.0037  0.033     
Emp/Est 0.000922*  -0.000832*  0.591***  0.14 
  
se 0.00049  0.00049  0.031     
 
Panel C  Measure  Elasticity 1  Elasticity 2 
   a  β  αL a  β  αL 
Mean Est  230.96  0.996 0.022  179.87 0.994  0.018 
Emp 694.50  0.999 0.064  -568.23  1.002  -0.052    
Emp/Est -435.82 1.002 -1.043  -1213.2  1.001  -1.109 
Median Est  485.48 0.998 0.045  1277.25  0.999  0.114 
Emp 507.66  0.998 0.047  1305.60  0.999  0.117    
Emp/Est -175.53 1.006 -1.017  -121.49  1.008  -1.012 
Quartile Est  245.72 0.996 0.023 171.83  0.994 0.017 
Emp 714.35  0.999 0.066  -543.52  1.002  -0.050    
Emp/Est -435.82 1.002 -1.043  -1213.2  1.001  -1.108 
 
Notes:  As for text, Table 1. 
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Table A3: Applying the G-H Model to Tanzania 
 
Panel A  Measure  γ  δ  Constant R
2 
Mean  Establishments  0.000270*** 0.0228* 0.396***  0.18 
se  -0.000097 -0.012  -0.023     
Employees  0.0102 -0.00995  0.402***  0.14 
se  -0.0099 -0.0099  -0.024     
Emp/Est  0.0151 -0.0149  0.397***  0.17 
  
se  -0.0093 -0.0093  -0.023     
Median  Establishments  0.000276*** 0.0204** 0.386***  0.23 
se  -0.000095 -0.0083  -0.023     
Employees  0.0192 -0.0189  0.403***  0.15 
se  -0.016 -0.016  -0.023     
Emp/Est  0.018 -0.0177  0.399***  0.16 
  
se  -0.012 -0.012  -0.023     
Quartile  Establishments  0.000263** 0.00889 0.407***  0.13 
se  -0.0001 -0.017  -0.023     
Employees  0.0102 -0.00995  0.402***  0.14 
se  -0.0099 -0.0099  -0.024     
Emp/Est  0.0187** -0.0184**  0.389***  0.2 
  
se  -0.0087 -0.0087  -0.023     
 
Panel B  Measure  γ  δ  Constant R
2 
Mean  Establishments  0.000189*** 0.0317 0.397*** 0.16 
se  -0.000069 -0.022  -0.024     
Employees  0.00611 -0.00942  0.405*** 0.13 
se  -0.01 -0.016  -0.025    
Emp/Est  0.0117 -0.0183  0.399***  0.15 
  
se  -0.0099 -0.016  -0.024     
Median  Establishments  0.000196*** 0.0332*** 0.381***  0.26 
se  -0.000065 -0.011  -0.023     
Employees  0.0105 -0.0165  0.406***  0.13 
se  -0.016 -0.025  -0.023     
Emp/Est  0.00939 -0.0146  0.404***  0.14 
  
se  -0.011 -0.018  -0.024     
Quartile  Establishments  0.000184** 0.0109 0.408***  0.13 
se  -0.00007 -0.025 -0.024     
Employees  0.00611 -0.00942  0.405*** 0.13 
se  -0.01 -0.016  -0.025    
Emp/Est  0.0206** -0.0324**  0.382***  0.23 
  
se  -0.0082 -0.013  -0.024     
 
Panel C  Measure  Elasticity 1  Elasticity 2 
   a  β  αL  a  β  αL 
Mean Est  43.87  0.98 0.01  31.55 0.97 0.01 
Emp  -101.53 1.01 -1.03 -106.81 1.01 -0.65    
Emp/Est  -68.13  1.01 -1.01 -55.28 1.02 -0.64 
Median Est  49.03  0.98 0.01  30.13 0.97 0.01 
Emp  -53.93  1.02 -1.02 -61.24 1.02 -0.64    
Emp/Est  -57.51  1.02 -1.02 -69.14 1.01 -0.64 
Quartile Est  112.52  0.99 0.03  91.76 0.99 0.02 
Emp  -101.53 1.01 -1.03 -106.81 1.01 -0.65    
Emp/Est  -55.36  1.02 -1.02 -31.50 1.03 -0.64 
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Table A4: Applying the G-H Model to Egypt 
 
Panel A  Measure  γ  δ  Constant R
2 
Mean Establishments  -0.00043 -0.0373  1.051**  0.00 
se 0.012  0.11  0.44     
Employees -0.000693  -0.0512  1.087**  0.00 
se 0.012  0.11  0.45     
Emp/Est -0.00453  0.00611  1.017**  0.00 
  
se 0.019  0.022  0.42     
Median Establishments -0.0000849 -0.00124  1.009**  0.00 
se 0.012  0.028  0.42     
Employees 0.000635  0.0584  0.873*  0.01 
se 0.012  0.1  0.48     
Emp/Est -0.00418  0.00564  1.013**  0.00 
  
se 0.019  0.022  0.42     
Quartile Establishments  -0.000699  -0.0434  1.093**  0.00 
se 0.012  0.093  0.46     
Employees -0.000649  -0.0492  1.081**  0.00 
se 0.012  0.11  0.45     
Emp/Est 0.00313  -0.00488  0.996**  0.00 
  
se 0.019  0.022  0.42     
 
Panel B  Measure  γ  δ Constant  R
2 
Mean  Establishments  0.00887*** -0.0202  0.727*  0.19 
se  0.0026 0.11  0.37     
Employees  0.00885*** -0.029  0.745*  0.19 
se  0.0026 0.11  0.38     
Emp/Est  -0.00172 0.0107  0.764** 0.19 
  
se  0.022 0.022  0.37     
Median  Establishments  0.00890*** -0.00409  0.721*  0.19 
se  0.0026 0.033  0.37     
Employees  0.00686*** 0.111***  0.248***  0.97 
se  0.0005 0.0031  0.067     
Emp/Est  -0.00145 0.0104  0.758** 0.19 
  
se  0.022 0.022  0.36     
Quartile  Establishments  0.00885*** -0.0222  0.743*  0.19 
se  0.0026 0.1  0.38     
Employees  0.00885*** -0.0281  0.743*  0.19 
se  0.0026 0.11  0.37     
Emp/Est  0.00685*** 0.0462***  0.311  0.48 
  
se  0.0021 0.0088  0.29     
 
Panel C  Measure  Elasticity 2 
      a  β  αL 
Mean Est  -41.51 1.025  -0.365 
Emp -27.48  1.038  -0.241    
Emp/Est 81.97  0.988  0.003 
Median Est  -84.07  1.012  -0.740 
Emp 6.75  0.871  0.047    
Emp/Est 86.99  0.989  0.043 
Quartile Est  -36.28  1.028  -0.318 
Emp -28.25  1.037  -0.248    
Emp/Est 16.95  0.944  0.117 
Notes: As for Table 3. 
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Table A5: Applying the G-H Model to Morocco 
 
Panel A  Measure  γ  δ  Constant R
2 
Mean  Establishments 0.0146  -0.0081 0.765***  0.04 
se  0.012 0.012 0.053     
Employees 0.018  -0.0116  0.754***  0.05 
se  0.012 0.012 0.055     
Emp/Est 0.0116***  -0.0113*  0.779***  0.07 
  
se 0.0044  0.0064  0.048     
Median Establishments  0.0122  -0.00559  0.771***  0.04 
se  0.012 0.012 0.052     
Employees 0.00523  0.00168  0.783***  0.04 
se  0.012 0.012 0.052     
Emp/Est 0.00322  0.00443  0.785***  0.04 
  
se 0.0073  0.0078  0.049     
Quartile Establishments  0.0163 -0.00979  0.759***  0.04 
se  0.012 0.012 0.055     
Employees 0.0179  -0.0114  0.755***  0.05 
se  0.012 0.012 0.055     
Emp/Est 0.0115***  -0.0114*  0.778***  0.07 
  
se 0.0044  0.0064  0.048     
 
Notes: As for Table 4. 
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Table A6: Applying the G-H Model to Tunisia 
 
Panel A  Measure  γ  δ  Constant R
2 
Mean Establishments  0.00276  0.00965* 0.625***  0.10 
se 0.0019  0.0052  0.021     
Employees 0.00614**  -0.00477  0.627***  0.08 
se 0.0026  0.0033  0.021     
Emp/Est 0.00338*  0.00344  0.629***  0.05 
  
se 0.002  0.006  0.022     
Median Establishments  0.00743**  -0.00591*  0.626***  0.09 
se 0.0029  0.0034  0.021     
Employees 0.00765**  -0.00625*  0.626***  0.10 
se 0.0029  0.0034  0.021     
Emp/Est 0.00539  -0.0022  0.629***  0.05 
  
se 0.0038  0.0041  0.022     
Quartile Establishments  0.00276  0.00953*  0.625***  0.10 
se 0.0019  0.0052  0.021     
Employees 0.00560**  -0.00435  0.628***  0.07 
se 0.0025  0.0034  0.021     
Emp/Est 0.00306  0.00371  0.628***  0.06 
  





Panel B  Measure  Elasticity 1 
      a  β  αL 
Mean Est  103.91  0.9905  0.2860 
Emp -210.93  1.0048  -1.2872    
Emp/Est 291.65 0.9966  0.9593 
Median Est  -170.46  1.0059  -1.2572 
Emp -161.22  1.0062  -1.2240    
Emp/Est -456.99 1.0022  -2.4500 
Quartile Est  105.22  0.9906  0.2896 
Emp -231.17  1.0043  -1.2874    
Emp/Est 270.36 0.9963  0.8248 
 
Notes: As for Table 5. 
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APPENDIX 2 PATTERN OF TARIFF REFORMS IN EAST AFRICA 
 
Figures A1-A3 illustrate the pattern of changes in the tariff structure for Kenya (in 1994 
and 2000), Tanzania (1993 and 2000) and Uganda (1994 and 2002). The columns give 
the percentage of tariff lines (products at the 8-digit HS level) at each tariff rate. In 
Kenya, the average unweighted tariff fell by almost two-thirds over the period. In 
Uganda, which had already liberalised considerably by 1994, the average tariff fell by 
about a half.  
 
Figure A1 shows the significant reduction in tariffs in Kenya: although there is some 
bunching at 40 per cent, the main bunching is at 15 per cent in 2000 compared to at 30 
per cent and 50 per cent in 1994. The distribution in 1994 appears quite flat, but this is 
because of the relatively large proportion of high tariffs. By 2000, the distribution was 
more compressed although still rather flat (low peakedness, as seen in the low kurtosis 
values in Table 10). 
 
Figure A2 shows the pattern for Tanzania. The coefficient of variation decreased: 
despite peak frequency around the mean (20 per cent rate) in 1993 a significant 
proportion of tariff lines were greater than 20 per cent, whereas by 2000 the 
compressed distribution resembled two peaks at either side of the mean (at 5 per cent 
and the maximum tariff rate of 25 per cent). 
 
The Ugandan case is illustrated in Figure A3, where the greater dispersion in 1994 is 
spread around the mean (20 per cent rate), whereas there is skewness to the left in the 
compressed spread of tariffs in 2002. In 1994, almost half of tariff lines were at 10 per 
cent, with about a quarter at each of 20 per cent and 30 per cent. By 2002, the majority 
of tariff lines were either 7 per cent or 15 per cent. 
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